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Abstract   
 
 
This paper examines the association between one of the most basic institutional forms, 
the family, and a series of demographic, educational, social, and economic indicators 
across regions in Europe. Using Emmanuel Todd’s classification of medieval European 
family systems, we identify potential links between family types and regional disparities 
in household size, educational attainment, social capital, labour participation, sectoral 
structure, wealth, and inequality. The results indicate that medieval family structures 
seem to have influenced European regional disparities in virtually every indicator 
considered. That these links remain, despite the influence of the modern state and 
population migration, suggests that either such structures are extremely resilient or else 
they have in the past been internalised within other social and economic institutions as 
they developed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The role of institutions as factors shaping human activity has attracted enormous 
attention in recent years. It has become increasingly clear that institutions, such as 
political systems (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001 and 2005), the legal rights 
of the individual (North 1990), or the various forms of ‘social capital’ amongst groups 
(Putnam, 1993 and 2000; Storper, 1997 and 2005) can have a significant bearing on a 
society’s ability to generate innovation, wealth, and growth. Yet, despite this growing 
interest, there is little consensus about either the type of institutions that have the 
greatest impact, or how institutions and their effects evolve over time. This paper 
examines the role within Europe of an often overlooked institution, the family, and 
concludes that its importance in determining socio-economic outcomes may have 
been greatly underestimated. Furthermore, the use of an historical data set allows us to 
present hypotheses regarding the persistence and evolution of institutions and their 
influence on contemporary European social and economic disparities.  
 
The importance of institutions is usually deemed to lie in their role in reducing the 
risks and transaction costs of investment and exchange (Parto, 2005). Dealing with 
another member of a community to which one belongs and so with someone either 
known personally, or through a mutual acquaintance, reduces the risk of fraud, 
unreliability or incompetence (Putnam, 1993, 2000). Dealing with a person bound by 
law to honour a contract, or a person checked via a credit bureau, for example, 
illustrates that similar benefits can be gained at a societal level through formal 
institutions (North, 1990, Acemoglu et al 2001, 2005). Institutions can do more than 
merely prevent negative influences on economic development, however, as social 
capital, for example, has also been strongly associated with indicators of innovation 
and dynamism (Schumpeter, 1926; Putnam, 1993; Storper, 1997 and 2005). In fact, 
some studies have suggested that the role of institutions may be absolutely 
fundamental to explaining both economic growth and economic disparities. The 
substantial body of work in recent years of Acemoglu and his collaborators 
(Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001 and 2005), for example, argues powerfully 
that the richest and poorest nations of the world owe their position more than anything 
to the political and legal institutions they developed or inherited from their colonial 
masters.  
                                                 
1 We are grateful to Alejandra Castrodad for outstanding research assistance and her help with GIS and 
to Thomas Farole for comments to earlier versions of the paper. Funding from the Canadian Social 
Science and Humanities Research Council (Duranton) and from the Royal Society-Wolfson Research 
Merit Award (Rodríguez-Pose) is gratefully acknowledged.  
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Institutions, however, can also act as a hindrance to economic development. In terms 
of formal institutions, an overdeveloped system of laws and regulations can increase 
transaction costs to the point where exchange or investment is unattractive, for 
example. In terms of informal institutions, the very formation of a group implies the 
exclusion of non-group members, and a lack of transparency and predictability which 
may engender inefficiencies and corruption. Most work in the field of social capital 
has tended to focus on the strengths of formal or ‘society’ institutions in contrast to 
the weaknesses of informal, ‘community’ institutions (North, 1990; LaPorta et al, 
1999; Rodrik et al, 2004) or vice versa (Granovetter, 1985; Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 
2000), while others have involved themselves in debates concerning which of the two 
is more significant (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004). More recently, others have 
attempted to synthesize ‘society’ and ‘community’ by noting how each type operates 
most beneficially in the presence of the other (Storper, 2005; Rodríguez-Pose and 
Storper, 2006). The latter approach observes that a balance of community and society 
is required in order to generate best-case outcomes in terms of micro-economic 
confidence, social policy and problem solving, all of which are then linked to 
dynamism and growth. For example, while community institutions remove 
informational barriers, and provide voice to communities of weak individuals, formal 
societal institutions can prevent communities from becoming corrupt or too exclusive. 
 
However, there is little in the literature which considers the role of one of humanity’s 
most basic forms of institution, the family, in determining either economic disparities 
or other forms of social or economic outcomes which have, in turn, an influence over 
economic development. It might be assumed that the impact of family structures is 
much less than other institutions, such as the state, religion, or the law, if only because 
of their small size, the limited number of transactions that take place within them, and 
their heterogeneity. However, some academics have noted strong patterns of family 
structure, with clear regional variations and persistence over time and linked them to 
significant social and economic outcomes. This includes the seminal work of 
Emmanuel Todd (Todd, 1990a; 1990b), upon which this study draws considerably, 
and the more recent work of Greif (2005, 2006). Todd (1990a, 1990b) has classified 
family structures into five various types and mapped them onto European regions, 
using them to help explain the historical development of regional variations, in terms 
of culture, economy, and politics. Greif (2005; 2006), meanwhile, uses family 
structure to examine the nature and the timing of the establishment of institutions such 
as medieval corporations and their subsequent impact on industrial take-off.  
 
This paper uses Todd’s (1990a) classification of family types in order to determine 
whether the existence or persistence (either directly or through intermediate 
determinants) of medieval family types shapes existing regional differences, including 
household size, educational attainment, labour participation, social capital, sectoral 
structure, and economic wealth and inequality, across regions of Europe. In so doing 
we hypothesise that the fundamental drivers behind the persistence of regional 
disparities across Europe are firmly rooted in institutional factors, such as family 
types and structures, whose origins can be traced at least to the Middle Ages, if not 
earlier. The paper uses regression analysis to establish the strength of the correlations 
between family structures and the dependent variables. This analysis enables us to 
offer some initial ideas regarding the role of family structure both in the development 
of other institutions and in economic development in general about which, to date, we 
have known ‘surprisingly little’ (Greif, 2005, p.2). 
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The paper is divided into the following sections: in section 2,  we examine Todd’s 
classification of family structure, including the presentation of a map showing how 
different family types are spread throughout Europe. Section 3 explains some of the 
issues surrounding the concept of the persistence of family types throughout history 
and reviews some of the theories linking family structures to regional economic and 
institutional outcomes. Section 4 describes the model, while section 5 presents our 
results, and then analyses them with a view to understanding how they may fit into 
existing conceptual frameworks. Finally, we conclude by observing that there do 
indeed appear to be strong links between family types and our dependent variables, 
and offer some initial thoughts of how this might affect our understanding of 
institutional and economic development in modern European history. 
 
 
2. Todd’s classification of family structure 
 
Todd’s 1990 book (Todd, 1990a, L’invention de l’Europe - The invention of Europe, 
Paris: Seuil) provides the characterisation of family types which forms our key 
explanatory variable. His classification of families has two main organising 
principles. First, families differ in how parents and children interact. At one extreme, 
children leave the parental nest as soon as they reach (early) adulthood and become 
independent from parental authority at an early age. At the other extreme, children 
remain subjected to their parents’ authority long after reaching adulthood and even 
after marrying. In other words, the relationship between parents and children can be 
thought of as either “liberal” or “authoritarian”. The second organising principle 
refers to the nature of the relationship between siblings. At one extreme, siblings (or, 
at least, brothers) may be treated as equal, whereas, at the other extreme, parents may 
favour one particular child (often the eldest) at the expense of the others. On this 
basis, families can be characterised as “equal” or “unequal”.  
 
These two oppositions, liberal/authoritarian and equal/unequal, are interesting for 
several reasons. First, they seem to capture two fundamental dimensions, liberty and 
equality, which matter both within families and wider society. With early childhood 
experiences having some bearing on adult values and behaviour (see Gross and 
McIlveen, 1998, chapters 39, 43, and 44, for an introduction to the vast psychology 
literature on these issues and also Bisin and Verdier, 2000, for a discussion of cultural 
transmission in the US), these categories provide us with an obvious channel of 
transmission from “family values” towards broader economic outcomes. Second, this 
two-dimensional characterisation avoids more simplistic oppositions (such as strong 
versus weak families) which, as we will see in our results, are hard to substantiate 
empirically. On the other hand, this typology avoids too much complexity and 
subtlety which would be hard to put to the data. Third, these categories are easy to 
measure empirically (see below) and most regions of Europe typically fall into one 
category or the other for both dimensions. Furthermore, it also appears that different 
family types seldom coexist in the same area. 
 
To measure liberal versus authoritarian families, Todd (1990a) looked at the 
cohabitation between generations within families, most particularly between parents 
and their married children. Where familial authority is strong, the eldest son does not 
leave the family home when he is married, but remains under the authority of the 
father. Similarly, unmarried adult daughters also typically remain in the family home 
under the authority of, first, their father and then their brother. These types of family 
are termed ‘stem’ families, in contrast to ‘nuclear’ families where familial authority is 
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said to be weak. Nuclear families only remain together while the children are growing 
up and, on marrying, or even on reaching adulthood, children leave the parental home. 
In effect, such children also leave behind their dependence on their parents, and the 
authority which their parents hold over them. Historically, the proportion of married 
children living with both their parents was trivially small in “liberal” areas. In 
contrast, in other areas, a significant fraction of married children still lived with their 
parents. 
 
To obtain systematic data for western Europe, Todd first used censuses from western 
European countries in the 1950s and 1960s. Using the administrative divisions of the 
time, he identifies regions of stem families as regions with a “high” proportion of 
adult children living with their parents, conditional on the fraction of population 
working in agriculture (since, all else being equal, parents and married children tend 
to live together more often in rural areas). By the 1950s and 1960s, the proportion of 
adult children living with their parents in stem family areas was typically low, often 
less than 10%. In order to check that these areas were historically dominated by stem 
families, rather than merely ‘backward’ or otherwise anomalous, Todd went through a 
very large number of historical monographs about particular regions (nearly 200 are 
cited in his 1990 book) and verified whether they contradicted his classification. He 
claims to have found no indication contrary to his original classification and to have 
made only very small adjustments. Since some of these monographs go back more 
than 500 years, this is strongly suggestive of lasting and stable patterns (and for this 
reason we refer to family types as medieval). There is some evidence that these 
patterns are even older than this. For instance, the prevalence of stem families in 
French Brittany, north western Spain, Wales, and Scotland coincides with areas where 
Celtic populations took refuge one or two millennia ago. The area of authority in 
central Italy ties in closely with the area of Etruscan civilisation in pre-Roman times.   
 
In order to measure equality, Todd followed the same approach of using relatively 
recent data for the whole of western Europe while checking whether the patterns that 
were uncovered were reflected in historical monographs. The key indicator of equality 
and inequality is what happens to family property after the death of the parents. 
Equality is said to be strongest where family property is divided most evenly between 
siblings, or (more usually) between brothers. Areas in which equal familial systems 
are operating are identified, therefore, by inheritance laws and practices. Some care is 
needed, however. In areas of nuclear families, inequality is easily identified by the 
institution of wills and testaments to define the final holder of the family property. In 
these areas, one child tends to inherit everything at the expense of his or her siblings. 
Families that combine inequality and liberalism are called ‘absolute’ nuclear by Todd 
(1990a). In the remaining areas of nuclear families, wills and testaments are 
unnecessary, as children, at least sons, inherit equally, sometimes by law. This 
‘egalitarian nuclear’ system encourages the persistence of slightly stronger relations 
between parents and children until the inheritance is completely divided after the 
parents’ death (Todd, 1990a: 37-38).    
 
Wills and testaments are also unnecessary in areas dominated by authoritarian stem 
families as the property is passed by strength of tradition to the eldest son, resulting in 
an institutionalised system of inequality. Todd explains that this is the case in all stem 
family areas, despite the fact that in some of them there have been laws stating that all 
children should inherit equally. However, Todd (1990a) claims that in these latter 
areas, classified as being dominated by ‘incomplete’ stem families, the strength of the 
primogeniture tradition overrides any such egalitarian law-making.  
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Finally, Todd terms a further category of family ‘communitarian’, where both familial 
authority and equality are strong. In areas dominated by this family type, married 
brothers remain living and working in the family home, under the authority of their 
father, but with the expectation of an equal inheritance.  
 
Table 1 summarises the interaction between the equality and the authority dimension 
while Table 2, below, provides a summary of the main characteristics of these five 
family types that emerge. 
 
Table 1. Family types defined by authority and equality 
 
 Egalitarian Non-egalitarian 
Strong authority Communitarian 
Stem (whether of an 
‘absolute’ or 
‘incomplete’ nature) 
Weak authority Egalitarian nuclear 
 
Absolute nuclear 
 
 
Table 2. Main characteristics of family types 
 
Family type Main characteristics 
Absolute nuclear Total emancipation of children in adulthood to form 
independent families made simply of a couple and their 
children. Division of inheritance among children by testament 
or will, usually to a single individual, often the son. Brothers 
and sisters are treated as independent individuals (Todd, 1990a: 
37). 
Egalitarian nuclear Total emancipation of children in adulthood to form 
independent families made simply of a couple and their 
children. Equal division of inheritance among children. This 
system encourages the persistence of slightly stronger relations 
between parents and children until the inheritance is completely 
divided after the parents’ death (Todd, 1990a: 37-38). 
Stem family Extended families with several generations living under one 
roof. One child – generally, but not always, the eldest – marries 
and has children that remain in the household in order to 
preserve the lineage. The rest have the choice of remaining 
unmarried within the household or of marrying and leaving the 
home or becoming soldiers or priests. The house and the land 
are inherited by the son who stays at home. Others may receive 
some financial compensation. The inheriting son, who stays at 
home, remains under the formal authority of the father (Todd, 
1990a: 38). 
Incomplete stem 
family 
As above, but with more egalitarian inheritance rules (in 
principle, but rarely in practice). 
Communitarian 
family 
Extended family in which all sons can get married and bring 
their wives to the family home. Equality among children in 
inheritance, with family wealth and estates divided after the 
death of parent (although a period of cohabitation between 
married brothers after the death of the parents is possible) 
(Todd, 1990a: 39-40). 
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Importantly, Todd’s data is only available on a map (Appendix 1 for a reproduction of 
Todd’s map). Furthermore, the regions used by Todd (1990a) are often outdated 
administrative units. In some cases, like France, these units roughly correspond to 
current administrative divisions (even though a few French departments have been 
created in the last forty years) and are being used today by Eurostat (the main data 
provider at the European level) for other variables. In other cases, such as the UK, the 
administrative map of Todd (1990a) differs quite significantly from the current 
regional map. To retrieve Todd’s data on family structure, we first digitised his main 
summary map of family structures in Europe (1990a: 74). Then using GIS software 
(ArcInfo), we overlaid NUTS III European regions. These are the smallest regions at 
which data is broadly available in Europe. This operation required a careful 
adjustment of Todd’s original map which does not appear to have been generated by 
any standard projection (but rather by the need to fit his map on one page of a book). 
We then used ArcInfo to read for each NUTS III region which proportion of its area 
was attributed to each family type. At the NUTS III level (1031 regions for 14 
countries), a large majority of regions are homogenous according to Todd’s 
classification.2 We also made two small corrections to Todd’s data. His original map 
puts the French region of Languedoc and the Spanish regions of Andalucía as 
indeterminate. However, his text indicates that Languedoc should be classified as 
incomplete stem and Andalucía as nuclear egalitarian (again like its neighbours).3 
Finally, given the paucity of European data at the NUTS III level, we aggregated our 
data at the NUTS II level (where NUTS III regions were weighted proportionately to 
their land area).    
 
Figure 1 represents a mapped version of our final output4. It presents the geographic 
spread of the family types identified by Todd over Europe. It also shows a sixth 
category, ‘indeterminate’, where information is unavailable or where family types do 
not conform to the other categories, or where no single category dominates. As the 
map indicates, the absolute nuclear family was dominant in southern and eastern 
England, eastern Scotland, north west France, Holland and other coastal regions of the 
Netherlands, and Denmark. The absolute stem family prevailed in the west of the 
British Isles, northern Spain, south western France, much of Germany and central 
Europe, as well as much of southern Sweden. Egalitarian nuclear families were 
strongest in northern and eastern France, most of Spain, and southern and north-
western Italy. As Todd has noted, the areas dominated by incomplete stem families lie 
on the borders between complete stem and egalitarian nuclear families, reflecting their 
mixture of egalitarian law, and non-egalitarian practices. Communitarian families are 
                                                 
2 After our initial treatment, for a small number of regions two family types appeared where one type 
had a dominant share of 98 or 99%. After inspection, these shares were rounded to 100% on the ground 
that the initial number reflected some small imperfection in the overlay of Todd’s original map and 
ours. 
3 Our results are not sensitive to these two minor changes. 
4 In order to create the adapted map presented in Figure 1, the following boundary datasets were used:  
- Continental Europe and Ireland: ESRI (2004). ‘Europe Basemap: Level 1 and 2 Provinces’. In: 
ESRI Data & Maps–World, Europe, Canada, and Mexico (Level 1: Sweden, Luxemburg, Norway, 
Denmark, Netherlands, Austria ; Level 2: Finland, Portugal, Ireland, Belgium, Switzerland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain). 
- UK: Edina UKBORDERS (2004). English and Welsh Counties and Scottish Regions for 1981 This 
is based on data provided through EDINA UKBORDERS with the support of the ESRC and JISC 
and uses boundary material (copyright of the Crown).  
- NUTS Regions in the EU: GISCO (2003). ‘Administrative/NUTS Regions: NUEC1MV7’. In: EU 
Boundaries CD Rom. Version 1. 
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relatively uncommon, occupying areas of central and northern Italy and large parts of 
the interior of Finland.  
 
Note that this map does not necessarily present current information. As already 
highlighted, some of these patterns seem to reflect very old historical divisions. 
Beyond the Etruscan and Celtic areas mentioned above, it is hard not to notice that 
regions where equality among siblings is prevalent tend to be core regions of Roman 
occupation. In particular the border between equality and inequality in Northern 
France (which, interestingly, does not correspond to the French-Belgian border) 
closely approximates the historical border between French and Flemish speaking 
populations which dates back to Roman times.  Importantly, this map of family 
structure does not appear to reflect an opposition between Northern and Southern 
Europe. Communitarian families are heavily concentrated in a few areas, whereas 
stem and nuclear families can be found nearly everywhere. Even more importantly, 
these family divisions do not coincide with national borders and most countries 
exhibit a high level of heterogeneity. France, for instance, contains nearly all types of 
families and no country considered in the analysis (except for Luxembourg) is entirely 
homogenous. This means that we will be able to identify the effects of medieval 
family structure and condition out national effects. This is important because even 
though family types do not solely reflect a North-South opposition (or any other 
geographic distinction), there might be some correlation between countries and family 
types (where, for instance, stem families seem to be over-represented in Northern 
Europe).  
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Figure 1. Family types in Europe. 
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3. The persistence of family types and their economic significance 
 
Although our information on family and kinship links and inheritance customs dates 
back, at least, to the Middle Ages, an underlying assumption of both Todd’s and our 
work is that these family types persist in some way to the present day. This 
persistence maybe direct, evidenced today perhaps by the relatively late age at which 
the offspring of Mediterranean families leave home compared to their northern 
European equivalents (Reher, 1998: 205). This form of persistence seems intuitively 
likely given the probability that children are brought up to consider their family 
traditions as proper and so recreate them with their own children. Alternatively, the 
persistence may develop through intermediate factors, such as the nature of political 
or economic institutions, shaped first by family structures and which, in turn, have 
continued to influence our society today in a path-dependant manner.  
 
However, a broad range of academic work in a variety of different fields either argues 
against these hypotheses or otherwise assumes that the persistence of family 
structures, whether direct or indirect, is not significant. For example, some of the most 
influential work on social capital, such as that of James Coleman (1988, 1990), 
assumes that highly developed social capital is a replacement for family structures 
which, as a result, have become an irrelevance. In this view, social capital is seen as 
more modern and beneficial than family structures and, once established, allows 
traditional family structures to wither away. Those who have studied the variety and 
influence of different family types have also used the idea of modernity and 
superseding institutions within the analysis of family types themselves. For example, 
Greif (2005, 2006) argues that nuclear families superseded other ‘kinship’ forms of 
family structure as part of the modernisation process throughout Europe, suggesting 
that while nuclear family types encouraged industrialisation, so too did 
industrialisation help to bring an end to non-nuclear forms of family (Greif, 2005: 3).5  
 
Overall, then, the idea that family types or institutions persist has been challenged in 
three different ways, each a description of one type of institution superseding another, 
as summarised in Table 3: 
 
Table 3. Superseding institutions 
 
Original institution Superseding institution Associated authors 
Family Social Capital James Coleman (1988, 1990) 
Community Society Max Weber (1921) 
Kinship families Nuclear families Avner Greif (2005) 
 
 
However, demographers are less confident that nuclear families have spread so 
rapidly as a result of industrialisation, and, indeed, regard this view as something of a 
myth. Smith (1993), for example, claims that demographers have argued consistently 
that the most notable thing about family structures was not their changing, but their 
constancy over centuries. He notes that economists as far back as Alfred Marshall and 
Adam Smith have used family structure to help explain disparities in economic 
                                                 
5 Indeed, Greif argues that the domination of Europe by the nuclear family was underway as early as 
the 8th century. (Greif, 2005: 3) 
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growth and development (Smith, 1993: 7)6, while pointing out that few demographers 
have disagreed with them since. Anstone et al (1999) also criticise those who have 
written about social capital without paying attention to the work of demographers, 
remarking directly on the work of Coleman, for example:  
 
“We disagree with Coleman’s assessment of the declining importance of the family in industrialized 
societies, and we argue that family formation is among the most important types of investment in social 
capital made in all societies. On this basis we contend that sociologists and other social scientists 
interested in social capital would do well to attend to the substantive findings of family demographers.” 
(Anstone et al 1999: 5) 
 
The essence of the demographers’ approach, as expressed by Anstone et al (1999) is 
that family structure is the origin and shaper of social capital and is built upon rather 
than superseded. Family structures may become internalised and reproduce 
themselves through communitarian interpersonal networks (Portes, 1998), for 
example, or through repeated behaviour within communities that ends up embedding 
cultural norms and values, leaving an indelible imprint across society (Hofstede, 
1980). Reher (1998) describes how family structures might directly reproduce 
themselves, even in the face of significant social upheaval: 
 
“Regardless of their historical origins, attitudes toward the family and the individual make up the cultural tapestry 
of societies, and thus they are models that are learned at a very young age and that societies – individuals, families, 
institutions – help perpetuate. Learning these behaviour patterns is the cornerstone of the socialization of children. 
They are attitudes shared by the society as a whole. Perhaps because of this, they have been so resistant to the 
otherwise corrosive effects of economic, political, social and demographic modernization. Even though the 
changes of this past century have tended to make cultures and mentalities more uniform, they have done little to 
erase the historic profiles of family systems in Europe” (Reher, 1998: 215) 7 
 
If the differences between family structures that were identified by Todd do indeed 
persist to the present then they may have a variety of economic impacts, which may 
help to explain current regional disparities and the difficulties of reducing them. Both 
Todd (1990a, 1990b,) and Greif (2005) have attributed to family structures an 
extremely influential role in the European industrial revolutions and subsequent 
economic growth. For example, it has been argued that the relative independence of 
the children of nuclear families, and their habit of leaving home early in pursuit of 
economic opportunities, made them a far more likely proletarian workforce compared 
to the offspring of communitarian or stem families. The latter were much less inclined 
to move away from the family to new cities or factories and may have thus favoured 
the persistence of agricultural practices (Todd, 1991: 38). The lack of any future 
inheritance for the majority of children in inegalitarian family areas may have also 
spurred the need to educate and train, in contrast to regions with more egalitarian 
traditions. Todd uses this argument as part of his explanation of how the absolute 
nuclear dominated north western France adapted to the crises of heavy industry in the 
1970s by shifting to different types of production, more effectively than other areas of 
                                                 
6 Scott Smith (1993) observes that both Smith and Marshall had the ‘liberal British’ belief that 
England’s nuclear family structure was both natural and proper and, as such, a factor in the UK’s 
economic success. 
7 Reher, in fact, goes on to argue that while the historical persistence of family structures is significant, 
the distinctions between stem and nuclear, and egalitarian and hierarchical are unnecessary. Instead, a 
simpler distinction between weak family ties in northern Europe and strong family ties in southern 
Europe is all that is deemed necessary to explain the significant differences between the two areas.  
This might be supported by the fact that there are no great economic differences between the areas of 
Spain dominated by stem authoritarian families and those dominated by egalitarian nuclear families 
(Figure 1). In both areas, for example, Reher notes that Spanish children leave home at similar ages and 
there are no clear differences in economic or other social structures (Reher, 1998: 221).  As will be 
seen, our results have some bearing on this debate. 
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France (1991: 144). This ability is seen as a reflection of the dynamism and 
adaptability engendered by the independence and drive of those brought up within the 
absolute nuclear tradition. In general, the increased mobility of people in absolute 
nuclear dominated areas could also be used to help explain either greater 
entrepreneurial capacity or lower levels of structural unemployment.  
 
On the other hand, the significance of family structures in the much-discussed success 
of interlinked small family firms in the Third Italy (Becattini, 1987; Storper, 1997: 
137-146), for example, offers one way in which close knit, communitarian family 
structures can hold advantages over looser, nuclear family types. Stem families, too, 
may have some advantages in certain economic and historical conditions. The inbuilt 
inequality associated with this family structure may lead to concentrations of capital 
or land that would facilitate, or create the appropriate incentives for the investment 
required for leaps in industrial development. It could also be argued that, while the 
offspring of nuclear families are more mobile, the offspring of stem families are more 
likely to work efficiently within the authoritarian labour systems of mass production. 
Overall, these various advantages and disadvantages of family types in terms of their 
suitability for various types of economic development may make it possible to 
construct a historical narrative in which different family types turn out to be more 
efficient at different times. While stem family dominated areas maybe to the fore in 
times of industrial mass production, nuclear family dominated areas may be better off 
when, as now, an economic context calls for adaptability and entrepreneurialism. 
 
As suggested above, however, the influence of family structures might also persist 
through intermediate factors, even if the original nature of the family has since 
changed (perhaps, for example, becoming homogenously nuclear throughout Europe, 
in Greif’s (2005) view). For example, it might initially be argued, following Greif 
(2005), that nuclear family dominated regions were more likely to develop formal 
associations, or ‘corporations’, whereas stem family dominated areas were prone to 
informal community type institutions within which transactions and agreements were 
framed. It might then be hypothesized that even if the nuclear family type spread 
across Europe, superseding all other types of family, the institutions that had 
originally been shaped in different ways by family structures had become resistant to 
further change, persisted to the present day and so continue to shape economic 
outcomes. Such outcomes, for example, might include lower transaction costs 
resulting from the more transparent and predictable rules governing exchange 
associated with formal institutions.  
 
We return to discuss these and other theories more thoroughly in the light of our 
results, below.8 
                                                 
8 This paper does not claim to address the question of whether family structures persist directly or 
indirectly through intermediate factors. Our hypothesis and results simply address the question of 
whether or not the influence of family structures persists in some way. Neither do we address whether 
family types are the primary cause or symptoms (or a first order outcome) of deeper historical, cultural 
or even geographical determinants that might shape either the nature of family structures themselves, or 
both family structure and other effects correlated with it. For example, even if links were confirmed 
between nuclear families and higher levels of social capital, the correlation might be the result of a 
shared, fundamental cause, such as levels of assimilation into the Roman Empire, or the practice of 
certain pre-Christian religions, rather than any direct causal relationship between the variables. Further 
analysis in this area can be found in the work of Mamadouh (1999) or Tabellini (2005) 
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4. The model 
 
Our starting hypothesis is that medieval family types – either directly, through their 
subsistence in time, or indirectly, through their internalisation in values, customs, and 
culture – are strongly associated with current regional disparities across Europe in the 
areas we are considering. The disparities in question have dictated our dependent 
variables and fall into several categories. We study demographic data in terms of 
average family size in 2000 and also with regard to educational attainment, measured 
by the percentages of the population with education up to primary and beyond 
secondary level in 1997. We also measure labour force participation in terms of 
overall and female employment; and social capital in terms of memberships of clubs 
and the percentage of people who meet with friends at least once a week; and we also 
measure sectoral structure by using the percentages of employment in manufacturing 
and services. Finally, we examine economic conditions and performance using GDP 
per capita in 2004, GDP growth between 1975 and 2005 and inequality as measured 
by Gini coefficients in 2004 (Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Dependent variables and sources 
 
Factor Variable Source 
Demographic 
structure 
 
 
• Average household size in 2000, 
measured in number of individuals 
per household 
• European 
Community 
Household Panel 
(ECHP) 
Educational 
attainment 
• Percentage of the population with 
education beyond secondary level in 
1997 
• EUROSTAT 
 
 
Labour force 
participation 
 
• Employment levels in 2003, as a 
percentage of the total adult 
population  
• Female participation in 2003, as a 
percentage of the total adult 
population  
• EUROSTAT 
 
 
• EUROSTAT 
 
Social capital 
 
• Membership of clubs in 2000, as a 
percentage of the population 
included in the sample  
• Percentage of people who meet with 
friends at least once a week in 2000, 
as a percentage of the population 
included in the sample  
• ECHP 
 
 
• ECHP 
Sectoral structure 
 
• Percentage of employment in 
manufacturing in 2003  
• Percentage of employment in 
services in 2003  
• EUROSTAT 
 
• EUROSTAT 
 
Economic 
performance 
 
 
• GDP per head in 2004, measured in 
constant Euros (base 1995) 
• Personal Gini coefficient, measuring 
inequality in income per capita in 
2000  
• Growth of GDP per capita 1975-
2004, measured in constant Euros 
(base 1995)  
• Cambridge 
Econometrics 
• ECHP 
 
• Cambridge 
Econometrics 
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These variables have been selected as a result of their potential relevance to current 
debates surrounding regional disparities in Europe, which have persisted despite the 
interventions and transfers of the European Community (Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi, 
2004). By selecting a wide range of indicators, representing demographic, social, and 
economic fields of study we hope to offer a set of similarly broad conclusions, while 
identifying which factors are affected by which aspects of family type.  
Our simple OLS model adopts the following form: 
y = α+ iF1β + iND2β +  εi  
where:  
 
y represents the dependent variables included in Table 4; 
 
Fi is the dominant family type in region i. Six family types corresponding to Todd’s 
classification as described above are used: 
 F1: Absolute nuclear 
 F2: Egalitarian nuclear  
 F3: Stem family 
 F4: Incomplete stem family 
 F5: Communitarian family 
 F6: Undetermined family types; 
 
NDi are national dummies, used to capture the effect of nationally defined factors on 
the dependent variables. F1, the absolute nuclear family and France are used as the 
family type and country of reference, and therefore not included in the regression 
analysis. All coefficients then can be interpreted as relative to the family type and 
country of reference; 
 
Finally ß1 and ß2 are the regression coefficients and ε is the error term. The territorial 
unit of analysis is made of 190 European NUTS II regions. Note that the national 
dummies play an important role in this regression. On the one hand, they ensure that 
the coefficient on family types does not pick up national effects. On the other hand, 
national dummies are going to capture the effects of family types to the extent that a 
dominant family type in a country will affect the outcomes for this country though for 
instance its national institutions. In this respect, Todd (1990b) argues that French 
institutions tend to reflect nuclear egalitarian values that come from the greater Paris 
region. This implies that our coefficients on family types probably under-estimate the 
true association between family types and regional outcomes.  
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 5.  
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Table 5. Summary of Results 
 
 
Family types 
  
Employment in 
manufacturing 
Employment in services GDP per capita Personal gini coefficient Growth of GDP (1975-2004) 
 
0.030875 -0.04076 -5122.77*** 0.002034 -0.29492 Egalitarian nuclear 
  0.023903 0.027007 1910.464 0.01364 0.204256 
0.029396* -0.03627* -2848.46** -0.00541 -0.24913* Stem  
  0.016631 0.018791 1329.295 0.009388 0.142326 
0.076486*** -0.07377*** -3981.69** -0.02386* -0.45568** Incomplete stem 
  0.024626 0.027824 1968.231 0.014056 0.211239 
0.113733*** -0.10959*** -5172.9* -0.04049** -0.0596 Communitarian 
  0.034087 0.038513 2724.476 0.020704 0.291558 
-0.00404 -0.00494 -9380.02*** -0.07007*** -0.51502** Undetermined 
  0.022649 0.02559 1807.796 0.013494 0.237306 
 National dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
df 17,170 17,170 18,171 15,151 18,162 
Number of obs 188 188 190 167 181 
F 3.67 6.27 11.63 35.02 18.85 
R-squared 0.2683 0.3854 0.5504 0.7767 0.6769 
Adj R-squared 0.1951 0.324 0.503 0.7546 0.641 
Notes: 
Coefficients relative to those of absolute nuclear families 
Standard errors in italics below coefficients 
***,**,* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level respectively 
 
Family types 
  
Average household 
size 
Education beyond 
secondary level 
Percentage 
working in total 
population 
Ratio of women to 
men in working 
population 
Membership of clubs 
 
Meeting friends once 
a week 
0.1572977* -3.28914* -0.02172* -0.03808* -0.06539*** -0.00701 Egalitarian nuclear 
  0.083817 1.778319 0.012086 0.022019 0.017009 0.023789 
0.0105163 -2.54524** -0.01459* 0.002998 -0.02511** 0.022202 Stem  
  0.0576895 1.237349 0.008409 0.015321 0.011707 0.016373 
0.1960223** -4.46812** -0.00819 -0.00935 0.009899 0.031304 Incomplete stem 
  0.0863731 1.83209 0.012451 0.022684 0.017528 0.024514 
0.0612747 -3.14732 -0.00651 0.038127 -0.04196 0.027728 Communitarian 
  0.1272206 2.536027 0.017235 0.0314 0.025817 0.036107 
0.062458 1.132148 -0.04646*** 0.017147 -0.06425*** -0.1294*** Undetermined 
  0.0829184 1.682753 0.011436 0.020835 0.016827 0.023534 
 National dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
df 15, 151 17,171 18,171 18,171 15, 151 15, 151 
Number of obs 167 189 190 190 167 167 
F 32.76 23.22 16.92 22.74 85.59 136.65 
R-squared 0.765 0.6977 0.6405 0.7054 0.8948 0.9314 
Adj R-squared 0.7416 0.6677 0.6026 0.6744 0.8843 0.9246 
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5. Family types and regional disparities in Europe 
 
The main result that emerges from Table 5 is the favourable position of absolute nuclear 
families, in comparison to all of the other five family types, with regard to current levels 
of GDP. Areas where absolute nuclear families dominate, or have dominated in the past, 
also have higher levels of inequality than regions of stem incomplete, communitarian, or 
indeterminate family type traditions (although the difference with either egalitarian 
nuclear or absolute stem family areas is not statistically significant). Recent growth in 
GDP has also been higher in absolute nuclear areas compared to both types of stem 
family and indeterminate areas, but not in the two types of egalitarian regions. The 
employment data also provides some striking differences. Once again, absolute nuclear 
families show better results than three other types of areas (those dominated by 
egalitarian nuclear, absolute stem and undetermined families), while showing no 
difference with either communitarian or incomplete stem areas.  
 
There appears to be a clear dividing line between nuclear families, on the one hand, and 
stem and communitarian families, on the other, with regard to employment sector. 
Employment in nuclear family dominated areas is more likely to be in services, while 
employment in stem or communitarian areas is more strongly linked to manufacturing. 
One social capital indicator is notable, showing that the people in egalitarian nuclear, 
absolute stem, and indeterminate family areas are less likely to have joined clubs or 
associations. The other social capital indicator is notable only in that our national 
dummies appear to be of much greater relevance than family type. Finally, demographic 
and educational data also isolates absolute nuclear family areas. These areas typically 
have smaller households than egalitarian nuclear or stem incomplete family areas, and 
have a greater proportion of people educated to university level. Absolute stem family 
areas show no difference in household size but also tend to educate fewer people to 
university level, while communitarian and indeterminate areas are similar with regard to 
either indicator. 
 
In general, our results appear to confirm that medieval family types in Europe have a 
significant and strong association with current regional disparities in household size, 
educational attainment, social capital, labour participation, sectoral structure, as well as 
with wealth and inequality. This suggests that family structures might either persist to 
the present, or that changes that they have caused historically have been internalised and 
preserved in a path-dependent manner9. Theories regarding similar types of association 
have already been investigated by Todd (1990a, 1990b, 1991), and those who have 
followed him (Mamadouh, 1999; Schultenover, 1999; Berry, 2000) and provide a 
framework within which our own hypotheses can be developed. The persistence in 
Europe of family structures throughout the last two millennia has been used in the past 
to help explain, for example, the relative levels of welcome or resistance to tides of 
change such as Protestantism and secularism (Todd, 1990a and 1990b; Schultenover, 
1999), political culture in general (Todd, 1990a and 1990b; Mamadouh, 1999), and 
specifically economic processes such as industrialisation and modernisation (Todd 
1990a, 1990b). Some of these theories have already been mentioned in section 3 above 
and offer an excellent starting point for much of our analysis.  
 
                                                 
9 A further possibility is that family structures are merely an outcome of a deeper, underlying determinant 
(such as religion or culture), and therefore endogenous to the causal process. Eliminating this possibility 
would require further testing.  
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Our clearest and most significant results appear to suggest that areas dominated by 
absolute nuclear families generally enjoy an advantage in terms of GDP per capita over 
every other type of region. Once the national effect is controlled for, regions with an 
absolute nuclear family tradition had in 2004 a GDP per head which was on average 
close to 3,000 euros higher than in areas with a stem family tradition; close to 4,000 
euros higher than in incomplete stem regions; more than 5,000 euros higher than in 
egalitarian nuclear or a communitarian dominated areas; and more than 9,000 euros than 
in indeterminate areas (Table 5). These regions have also enjoyed better recent GDP 
growth compared to stem family dominated areas. Between 1975 and 2004 the growth 
of GDP per capita in areas dominated by absolute nuclear families outstripped that of 
egalitarian nuclear, stem, and indeterminate family traditions by between 13 and 15 per 
cent, and that of incomplete stem family types by close to 20 per cent. Only 
communitarian family tradition areas kept up with absolute nuclear areas in terms of 
economic growth (Table 5). It would be tempting to draw some simple conclusions 
regarding this correlation, and argue that the absolute nuclear family structure is better 
suited to economic development. However, one need only reflect on the difficulty of 
defending this position in the late 1970s, when England was considered the ‘sick man of 
Europe’ to understand that no such simple conclusion is available. Different countries 
have led European economic development at different times, and at no time since the 
1870s has it been possible to argue that the stem family dominated area of Germany, for 
example, has been economically backward.  
 
It is possible to build a more subtle and powerful explanation of how family types may 
directly influence economic development, using some of the arguments already 
described in section 2.1 above. First, the nuclear family’s tradition of emancipation 
increases potential for movement away from the family home which can facilitate the 
pursuit of independent economic opportunities. Second, the inability to rely on the 
family for income and housing could be said to generate a more entrepreneurial spirit of 
self-reliance, as well as greater motivation to work. Third, in absolute nuclear families, 
the principles of primogeniture may exaggerate these first two tendencies still further, as 
non-inheriting children are left even more reliant on their own initiative. As a result, we 
would expect the offspring of absolute nuclear families to move further, faster, and take 
greater risks in order to take advantage of economic opportunities, especially in times of 
structural economic adjustment.   
 
To take a concrete example of this type of argument, let us consider Todd’s analysis of 
the stark economic and sectoral divides within France (Todd, 1991: 38). He argues that, 
in the 19th century, the creation of an industrial workforce was only possible in the 
nuclear family dominated north, as the offspring of southern stem families were 
unwilling to uproot themselves away from the family home to work in urban factories. 
Todd also suggests that the difference between egalitarian nuclear and absolute nuclear 
families may account for the differences in economic dynamism between north eastern 
and north western France, as western Europe adjusted from manufacturing to service 
economies in the later 20th century. He argues that the current areas of decline and 
structural unemployment in egalitarian nuclear north eastern France compare 
unfavourably to the dynamism and flexibility of both north western France and 
England, where the economy has adjusted more successfully. 
 
The lack of adaptability and dynamism, it is argued, is related to the relative lack of 
pressure on the offspring of egalitarian families, due to their expectations of inheritance.  
The statistically significant correlations between absolute nuclear families and GDP, 
recent growth and inequality would all appear to support these interpretations. 
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Our results concerning the proportion of the working population in the industrial and 
service sectors also seem to support this interpretation, demonstrating what appears to 
be a clear dividing line between stem and communitarian families, on the one hand, and 
nuclear families, on the other. While in 2003 communitarian family dominated areas 
had a share of employment in manufacturing that was more than 11 points higher than 
in absolute nuclear family type regions and in incomplete stem and stem areas this 
difference was 7.6 and 3, respectively, the roles were reversed when employment in 
services was considered. In this category, the difference were of 3.6 points with respect 
to stem family areas, 7.3 with respect to incomplete stem, and 11 points with respect to 
communitarian family dominated regions, always in favour of absolute nuclear regions 
(Table 5).  Given the hypothesis that absolute nuclear families should be more able to 
adapt to new economic structures, we would expect these regions to reflect a more 
modern sectoral balance, which very much appears to be the case. It could be argued 
that the nuclear areas industrialised first, grew faster and are now further along the path 
of modernisation having transformed more quickly and fully into service societies. 
However, while the absolute nuclear dominated UK did indeed industrialise first, there 
are many instances of stem dominated areas industrialising before other absolute 
nuclear areas and it would therefore be unwise to attribute industrial take-off or 
economic development in general, solely to family structure.  
 
A finer version of this story could be developed by returning to the discussion regarding 
dynamism, flexibility, and entrepreneurialism. Rather than simply being ‘further ahead’, 
the offspring of absolute nuclear families, being less dependent on their families and 
more entrepreneurial in spirit, are more likely to be able to adapt, move or change in 
response to any given economic change or sectoral shift. That is to acknowledge that, 
while many factors exogenous to family structure are likely to be the cause of major 
economic changes, family structure itself may be a key determinant of the ability to 
adapt to those changes. Having made a similar argument about north western and north 
eastern France, Todd adds (1991: 150) that areas where the numbers working in services 
increased also saw increases in the numbers working in industry, too. This would appear 
to strengthen our interpretation that absolute nuclear areas are simply more adaptable 
regardless of the circumstances, rather than merely ‘ahead’ in terms of the transition 
from industry to service based economies. 
 
The advantage of this view is that it takes account of the obvious fact that other factors 
apart from family structure may produce economic change (for example, coal reserves, 
or political structure, in the case of German industrialisation). That is to say that even 
when family structure is not the fundamental cause of change, it can determine how a 
region might react to a wave of change caused by something else. It would be beyond 
the scope of this paper to attempt to measure precisely the level of adaptability of 
certain economies at times of historical change but we can posit some examples to 
illustrate out point with regard to the UK. First, and most obviously, it was the first to 
industrialise, and was at the forefront of industrial, economic and social development 
throughout the nineteenth century. Second, after the Second World War, despite losing 
its industrial and technological edge to Germany, it was amongst the first to react to new 
social realities by establishing a comprehensive welfare state. Third, and most relevant 
to our results, it was famously also among the first to adapt to the new economic 
realities of the late 1970s and 1980s, along with other absolute nuclear dominated areas 
such as Denmark. It is noticeable that the current economic problems facing stem and 
egalitarian nuclear dominated countries, such as Germany and France, are often closely 
linked to a perceived lack of flexibility. 
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A key part of this adaptability may lie in the availability and nature of social capital, and 
here again our results can be used to support our general hypothesis. The results in 
Table 5 suggest that the offspring of absolute nuclear families are amongst the most 
likely to form associations and join clubs. One possible reason for this is that they are 
less able to depend on their families for support and so must form other networks in 
order to compensate. As these are built amongst people who do not necessarily have 
kinship ties, they have both greater potential for expansion, and are also more likely to 
have formal rules and hence greater transparency. As a result, they may be more 
efficient and conducive to growth. Grief (2005) suggests something closely related to 
this when describing how nuclear families, in medieval times, facilitated the 
establishment and growth of what he calls ‘corporations’10: 
 
For an individual, corporations reduce the benefits from belonging to a kinship group [non-nuclear family 
structure] while a nuclear family increases the benefits from being a member of a corporation (Greif 
2005: 1-2) 
 
Thus, Greif presents a virtuous circle whereby causation works in both directions – 
nuclear families providing encouragement for the establishment of corporations, and the 
related economic and social transformation encouraging the domination of the nuclear 
family across Europe. Greif goes on to reflect that nuclear families seem to encourage 
both flexibility and independence, and that societal institutions are developed in part as 
a response to the lack of safety net or associational benefits that are provided by non-
nuclear family types. The growth of corporations is then used to help explain why the 
British monarchy had its influence limited, and the interests of the merchant class began 
to have more significance. This is a familiar argument and reminiscent of Acemoglu et 
al’s (2001, 2005) view of economic and political development.  
 
However, whereas Greif (2005) and others (Coleman 1988, 1990) have seen the growth 
of social capital as replacing family structures throughout Europe, it maybe possible to 
argue that absolute nuclear family structures have merely allowed the formation of a 
particular sort of social capital in certain regions which did not become so prevalent 
elsewhere. This view is certainly supported by the results in terms of egalitarian nuclear 
and absolute stem families, but not in the cases of incomplete stem family or 
communitarian dominated areas. The persistence of strong family relations, at least until 
the death of the parents, in nuclear egalitarian family dominated areas, such as southern 
Italy or central and southern Spain, has been argued to act as a hindrance in the 
development of fully-fledged societal institutional systems and, eventually, as a barrier 
to economic development (compare Banfield, 1957 or Trigilia, 1992, for the case of the 
Italian Mezzogiorno). The measurement of social interaction with friends, however, 
shows virtually no correlation with our categories – and the national dummies indicate 
that this is determined much more by national habits than family structure.  
 
Associations between education and household size might also be used to support this 
picture. The results in Table 5 indicate that the offspring of absolute nuclear families are 
more likely to be educated beyond secondary level. Education can also be linked 
exogenously to absolute family structures by arguing that, if one cannot depend on 
either the support of one’s family or on an inheritance, then there is a greater motivation 
to ensure you are educated and able to take advantage of whatever economic 
                                                 
10 Defined as “intentionally created, voluntary, interest-based, and self-governed permanent institutions,” 
with medieval examples given including guilds, fraternities, universities and modern examples including 
professional and business associations and consumer groups (Greif, 2005: 1) 
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opportunities are presented. This might also be linked to household size, by pointing out 
that two of the three family types that have lower levels of post-secondary education 
(egalitarian nuclear and stem incomplete) also tend to generate larger households. As 
such, it may be possible to argue that smaller family size, and therefore greater 
concentration of resources makes it easier for absolute nuclear families to send their 
children to university (Becker, 1960). Indeed, Todd (1991) has argued that inegalitarian 
families are likely to be smaller than egalitarian ones, as it is more difficult to see more 
children settled when only one child receives the bulk of the inheritance. The results 
offer support for this view. 
 
Our general employment indicator suggests little directly, hinting merely at the overall 
superior economic performance of the absolute nuclear areas. This fits the overall story 
of the generally advantageous position of absolute nuclear areas, and also supports 
Reher’s (1998: 216) theory that, in general, areas around the Mediterranean (dominated 
by egalitarian nuclear and stem absolute family types) have a higher rate of 
unemployment, related in part to the greater ability of the family to provide support. As 
with many other social (as opposed to economic) indicators there is also difference 
between egalitarian and absolute nuclear in terms of the ratio of women in the 
workforce. In this case we note that our findings concur with the view that women are 
more likely to enter and/or remain in the workforce when they have fewer children 
(Wong and Levine, 1992) – supported tentatively by the correlation in our data between 
average household size and this ratio. 
 
The final indicator to be considered shows that areas dominated by absolute nuclear 
families have greater inequality than indeterminate, communitarian and incomplete stem 
areas. There is no significant difference, however, between absolute nuclear and either 
egalitarian nuclear or absolute stem families. Given our argument so far, and its support 
of the traditional views of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ and continental models, the higher level of 
inequality in absolute nuclear areas is perhaps unsurprising. It is also to be expected, 
perhaps, that the inegalitarian absolute stem families do not show a marked difference. 
However, the lack of any statistically significant difference between absolute nuclear 
and egalitarian nuclear areas in this regard is rather surprising. It could be hypothesized 
that in the latter case, the source of inequality might be from higher structural 
unemployment due to stagnation rather than from economic dynamism, but this is 
clearly only the most tentative of suggestions.  
 
To summarise the identified characteristics of each family type, we can suggest the 
following:  
 
Regions with absolute nuclear families generate smaller households, a more educated 
population, and a higher percentage of population in employment. They lead to greater 
formal membership of clubs, perhaps as a form of compensation for the lack of 
socialisation within the family. They are currently associated with service societies, and 
have generated richer and more dynamic regions, although also more inequitable 
societies. Regions with an imprint of absolute nuclear families seem to be early 
adopters, first in terms of the transition between an agricultural and an industrial society 
and then from the industrial to the service society. It thus may be that the higher 
economic dynamism of these areas is most in evidence in periods of change and less so 
in periods of stability. 
 
Regions where egalitarian nuclear families tended to predominate have larger 
households, lower overall levels of educated population, lower activity rates, and lower 
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female participation in the labour force. A small but more universally available 
inheritance maybe seen as a deterrent for higher education, as would the larger family 
size. While there is no big difference with absolute nuclear family areas in terms of 
sectoral structure, inequality, and dynamism, these regions tend to be poorer, perhaps as 
a result of their weaker ability to adapt to sectoral shifts in the economy. 
 
Regions with a tradition of stem families are associated with larger household size, 
lower levels of education and lower participation in the labour force, but not necessarily 
lower female participation. They are currently predominantly industrial societies and 
tend to be poorer and less dynamic than nuclear family dominated areas.  
 
Regions with communitarian family traditions surprisingly do not lead to bigger 
households, or less educated populations, or less overall participation in the workforce. 
Such regions tend to be manufacturing societies and poorer, but more equal, than areas 
of absolute nuclear family traditions.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The arguments put forward above indicate that the links between family structure and 
socio-economic outcomes deserve attention and may offer significant progress towards 
understanding why some regions are richer, have different levels of social capital, are 
more able to adapt to sectoral shifts, or are more unequal than others. This is the case 
whether or not stem and communitarian families in the areas in which Todd identified 
them still remain or have been replaced by nuclear families; what is clear is that at least 
some effect seems to persist. While settling the controversies regarding the direction 
and nature of the causal processes involved is beyond the scope of this paper, our most 
plausible hypotheses all suggest some causative influence flowing from family structure 
to the persistence of disparities in social and economic development across Europe. It is 
also worth noting that these results would seem to suggest that Reher’s (1998) criticism 
regarding the over-complexity of Todd’s classification is misplaced, as we can see that 
significant differences emerge not just between northern and southern Europe, but also 
along the lines of authority and liberty and equality and inequality that Todd identified. 
Our conclusions go beyond merely reinforcing the belief that the societies and 
economies of southern and eastern Britain, north west France, and the shores of the 
North Sea are stronger and more adaptable. By appearing to confirm that either family 
structures or their influence persist to the present, and may have a strong influence on 
growth and dynamism, our research suggests that any attempt to replicate that 
dynamism, labour mobility, or sectoral shifts elsewhere in Europe through targeted 
projects and investment may reap weaker dividends than expected. As well as the 
traditionally cited causes of regional disparity, such as peripherality or lower 
endowments of human capital and infrastructure (Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi 2004), 
policy makers may need to deal with institutional barriers related to inherited family 
structures and cultures peculiarly resistant to change. Indeed, it could be argued that this 
is part of the evidence we require in order to explain why the impact of policy 
intervention in the past has been limited.  
 
The results of this paper may also have a bearing on the current debates in social capital 
regarding the origins, roles, and value of community and society type institutions. 
Families, or kinship groups could be seen as ‘concentrated’ or exaggerated forms of 
community, given their even more limited geographical spread, the more intense 
personal relationships, and even stronger barriers to entry.   However, nuclear families 
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are somehow less ‘family-like’ than other, stronger forms of kinship in communitarian 
or stem family dominated areas, as there are much weaker personal links and more 
movement and mixing. In this way, it could be argued that in some ways, the 
differences between nuclear and stem families reflects the differences between 
community and society described in the social capital literature. Alternatively, we might 
investigate, as does Greif (2005), whether different family structures produce differing 
emphases on community and society, where nuclear families might be expected to lead 
to stronger society type institutions, and stem and communitarian family structures to 
stronger community type institutions. Whatever interpretative framework is used, it is 
reasonable to conclude that family structure deserves to be a fundamental component of 
the society and community debate.  
 
Our methods have also illustrated the further potential of applying quantitative methods 
to what is often seen as an inexact and qualitative subject. There are undoubtedly other 
significant variables which may offer illuminating correlations with family structures. 
Indicators of local differences in corruption, bureaucracy, and personal and government 
spending patterns might all be usefully analysed in a similar fashion, and so further 
illuminate the considerable amount of work that has already been done on social capital 
and governance (Putnam 1993, Boix and Poisner 1998). One study has already managed 
to produce statistically significant correlations between democracy and family structure 
using regression analysis (Ersson 1995) and other correlations may form the basis of 
other rich fields of study.  
 
To some extent, we have only established that there are important questions to answer, 
rather than actually providing answers itself. Apart from attempting further analysis of 
the nature of the causative processes that have produced our correlations, other 
questions emerge. How much longer will the influence of family structures last, and 
what shape might it take in the future? Given the fact that the upheavals of the last 200 
hundred years appear to have had little effect on the influence of family structure, 
perhaps we should expect its persistence to remain. On the other hand, it might be the 
case that mass migration and globalisation will finally put an end to the marked 
differences caused by family structures.  
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Figure A1. Todd’s map of family types in western Europe (Source: Todd, 1990a) 
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